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working the apocalypse: millennium
and the maintenance of the uncanny
Judy Rosenthal: The authors of these three
books examine particular religious communi-
ties and their political manifestations, looking
at relationships between language practices
and conversion and among narrative repeti-
tion, time, and political action. The rel igions-
Baptist Fundamentalism, Pentecostalisms, and
apocalyptic groups such as the Branch Davidi-
ans—aim to domesticate the alienation and
soul sickness common to the cultural territory
of modernity. At the same time, they reenchant
the home front, bringing florid biblical catas-
trophe and Utopia (or other textual traditions)
into the everyday lives of the faithful. John
Hall's collection addresses millennium,
apocalypse, and violence in the context of in-
famous cults and their standoffs with the state.
Susan Harding's book about jerry Falwell fo-
cuses on how his charisma is consiruc led and
deployed when creating a modernist politi-
cized fundamentalism, a turning point in the
religious right's accumulation of power in the
United States. Harding addresses the efficacy
of using biblical stories to create latter day ful-
fi 11 ment of the Word of God—the reenactment
of these stories serving as proof of biblical truth
for the faithful and the resulting reenchantment
of a flattened modernized world (the "awaken-
ings" that occur are "deeply exhilarating and
wildly transformative"; they involve "expan-
sive thrill" [p. 131)). Vincent Crapanzano
writes about taking text literally and the nature
of such literalism in the discourses of religious
fundamentalists and judges of the Supreme
Court. Crapanzano comes close to positing a
direct relationship between biblical literalism
and political conservatism of various kinds.
In reviewing these works it is fitting to link is-
sues of religious language and political prac-
tice to three topics: apocalyptic violence, reen-
actment of biblical narrative, and textual
literalism. We have also injected our own leit-
motif, the unheimlich (in brief, the uncanny, as
well as the angst accompanying the experi-
ence ofhomelessness). The subjects of all three
volumes include popular longings for a differ-
ent kind of world, for more earthshaking sense
or more beautifully dramatic meaning in life,
although the authors do not posit such popular
longings as a sufficient explanation for the rise
of the religious movements. There is a close re-
lationship between these enchanted premod-
ern satisfactions and religious positivism and
scientism, including the move to make funda-
mentalism and millenarianism resolutely mod-
ern and politicized (both epistemologically
and practically with regard to the use of tech-
nology for politico-religious outreach and, in
some cases, for resistance to the state).
The three books a re especially interesting to
me because I grew up a Jehovah's Witness in a
Texan working class family and because my
fieldwork in anthropology is about West African
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Vodu culture. Jehovah's Witnesses are mille-
narians with a vested interest in the Armaged-
don of the Book of Revelation; Vodu worship-
ers are liters lists of a kind, in that their fetishes
are considered to be literal, concrete deities
and not representations or metaphors. That
said, the relationship of Jehovah's Witnesses to
the Word of Cod is not exactly the same as that
of jerry Falwell and his followers, northat oi the
fundamentalists Crapanzano examines. Fur-
ther, the literalism of the Vodu fetish is not the
literalism of the text in the strict sense, as Cra-
panzano writes about it.
What is similar about Jehovah's Witnesses,
the Moral Majority of Jerry Falwell, and the
Christian fundamentalists in Serving the Word
is their effort to interpret the Bible as fact
through their involvement in a modernity that
includes believing that everything in the Holy
Scriptures is properly scientific. They are posi-
tivists, assured that they really can establish the
most significant truths of the centuries with
verses from the Bible. They also practice a her-
meneutics oi bible study and witnessing
whereby they deftly move from one verse to
another, building evidence through textual
space and sacred time for their apocalyptic
and millenarian doctrines and emotions. All
believe that the Word comes true over and
over again as narrative and event; the biblical
sagas foreshadow what is happening now, the
last days before God brings destruction to the
wicked and begins the new dispensation.
Harding compellingly describes such em-
ployment of bible stories to give meaning to
specific predicaments in the present and to
weave Christian identities through the practice
of identification with the characters of scrip-
ture in her ethnography oi jerry Falwell's em-
pire. I remember going from door to door dur-
ing my own childhood and experiencing the
excitement of showing polite householders the
marvelous nature of the word of God in the sto-
ries that were being relived in the present, with
us at the center of the universe. When Harding
writes oi Falwell's 1978 "circling Liberty
Mountain in prayer" (p. 11 7) (in a mimesis of
Joshua and the Israelites circling Jericho) so as
to raise seven million in funds for his ministry, I
was struck with the apparently demagogical
and calculating nature of the scheme he en-
gages in andwith his perhaps utter sincerity in
this purported refulfillment of biblical narra-
tive.
The subjects of all three books and Jehovah's
Witnesses also share a belief in and practice of
the end time (not always the biblical version),
the Apocalypse, or the battle of Armageddon.
They all have a concept of history that is bibli-
cal or mystical and both replayed (past and
present flowing through eac h other) and linear,
the end time always hovering ever nearer. And
these several histories include as center stage
actors the chosen Christians (the Moral Major-
ity and other fundamentalists) or members oi
groups discussed in Apocalypse Observed'(the
Peoples Temple of Jonestown, the Branch
Davidians of Waco, Aum Shinrikyo of japan,
the Solar Temple, and Heaven's Gate). Most of
these players believe that their actions hasten
the end or make it possible by fulfilling proph-
ecy and, i n some cases, by carrying out the wit-
nessing that must be completed before God
will destroy the wicked.
The particular critical stance these authors
take toward their subjects raises ethnographic
questions. For example, is it more difficult for
anthropologists to write about the religious
right in the United States than to write about
Vodu, Moroccan, or South African culture?
Crapanzano has previously written about peo-
ple with whom he is in fundamental ethical
disagreement (see Waiting, 1985). The jerry
Falwell crowd fails to seduce Harding as well,
and she is somewhat contrite about disap-
pointing them (they wish her to show signs of
conversion to their faith, but she does not con-
vert). Although John R. Hall, Philip Schuyler,
and Sylvaine Trinh are more sympathetic than
the press and popular opinion in general, they
make no bones about expressing general dis-
approva I of their subjects' bel iefs and behavior
(it would be hard to approve of mass suicide or
murder). What are the implications of this ab-
sence of seduction that distinguishes these
three studies from a great many others contain-
ing the writers' heartfelt approval of or sympa-
thy for (even conversion to) the subjects' cul-
ture, including practices of the sacred?
Adam Lutzker: Picking up from your
questions, I agree that religion is a problematic
topic for academics—scholars have trouble
finding a place to speak that is neither too close
to nor too far from their subject. Both explana-
tions introduce a problematics of distance that
necessitates theorizing the relationship be-
tween the knowledge-producing subject and
the object of discourse, a theme of great signifi-
cance to the reflexive turn in anthropology (see
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Clifford and Marcus 1986). Both Harding and
Crapanzano confront this problem by reflect-
ing on the implications of their ethnographies
forthcirown subcultures (intelligentsia, liberal
academic, postmodern anthropologist) in the
United States.
The late-20th-century revival of religious
belief, both orthodox and unorthodox, is as sig-
nificant for social theorists as it was unex-
pected. In dominant theories of the early post-
war period, modernization and secularization
went hand in hand (think of Talcott Parsons'
work as a paradigm). This was clearly wrong,
in retrospect, and coming to terms with the re-
ligious revival that happened is an important
task for a social theoretical understanding of
today's problems and prospects. I speak from a
position within the secular left that includes the
realization that secularism is an ideology with
its own internal ideological tensions and dy-
namics.
One obvious interpretive strategy is to see
religious revivalism as a nostalgic response to
the absence of a space for human meaning
within modernity's disenchanted world view.
Religion reenchants the world by investing
everyday events with greater significance and
history with a clear plot, an attempt to make
humans at home in a world that has become
unheimlich2 I find this movement unsettling
because it is not linked to an explicit theoriza-
tion of modernity and the associated reasons
for feeling out of place in the modern world. I
prefer social theoretical critique to nostalgia;
yet the three books under review show that
contemporary fundamentalism is not reaction-
ary nostalgia—it is something new and differ-
ent, at least in the United States (I think else-
where as well). Fundamentalism today is not
antimodern, and that is why it is sodisturbing.
Harding argues at the end of her book that
Falwell should be seen as an internal product
of modernism rather than as an external re-
sponse to it. That is clearly true in his methods,
such as his ability to exploit resources oi the
mass media, but also in the substance of his
message—the nationalism, the consumerism,
and the willingness to see the state as a tool and
ally.
the book of Jerry Falwell—religious
practice as consumerism
Judy Roscnthal: Like Crapanzano, Susan
Harding disapproves of the culture that is her
subject. Yet she seems to go further than Cra-
panzano in her willful suspension of critique
(p. 57) in order to gain access to fundamental
Baptist logic and passion. "The membrane be-
tween disbelief and belief is much thinnerthan
we think. All I had to do was to listen to my wit-
ness and to struggle to understand him. just do-
ing so did not make me a fundamental Baptist
born-again believer, but it drew me across that
membrane in tiny ways so that I began to ac-
quire the knowledge and vision and sensibili-
ties, to share the experience of a believer, this
space between belief and disbelief, or rather
the paradoxical space of overlap, is also the
space of ethnography. We must enter it to do
our work" (p. 58). Harding speaks of Falwell's
"fundamentalist empire" as "an immense em-
pire of words, a factory of words, a veritable Bi-
ble-based language industry" (p. 15).
Harding traces the path of conservative Prot-
estantism from the 1925 Scopes trial to the
present. In her fascinating account of the
consequences of the Scopes trial, she cites fun-
damentalist literalism as the key to William
Jennings Bryan's defeat. Clarence Darrow was
able to employ Bryan's own interpretive
tools—"the rules of fundamentalist rhetorical
combat" (p. 73)—against him, and there was
no recourse. This event marked an end to fun-
damentalist contestation on the political stage
and rendered Bible-believing Protestants mar-
ginal until the late 1970s. This was true be-
cause "at the national level, signs of religious
partisanship were voluntarily suppressed" (p. 75)
and because most fundamentalists also believed
it was scripturally forbidden for Christians to
take part in the politics of this world (St. Paul's
command to "render Caesar's things to Caesar
and God's things to God"). Conservative Prot-
estants today may find secular humanists to be
their main enemies in the United States, led by
Satan himself to "take over America from its
rightful Christian heirs" (p. 75).
After Falwell expanded his ministry and fol-
lowing during the 1970s, he began his mission
of pulling fundamentalism away from its isola-
tionism and propelling it into the very center of
American culture and politics (p. 16). Because
Falwell had been remarkably successful in at-
tracting college students and academics in the
1970s, the middle-c lass component ot his con-
gregation had increased greatly by the 1980s.
Before Falwell's movement, the separatist
ethos ScK red to fundamentalists kept them out
of worldly professions such as medicine, law,
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and journalism (p. 147). In 1996 he took the
step of joining his church with the Southern
Baptist Convention, a network less isolated
and thus more open to the middle class than
was Falwell's own group. Harding calls this
move "a major turning point in the history of
American fundamentalism" (p. 16).
Falwell's ability to make his fundamentalism
more inclusive—to join it with evangelism and
middle-class Protestant conservatism in gen-
eral—enabled him in 1979 to name all of these
groups "the Moral Majority" (p. 20). "Born-
again Christian rhetorics, by definition, su-
tured up the two things kept apart, by defini-
tion, under the regime of secular modernity—
routine political activism and aggressive, Bi-
ble-based super-naturalism" (p. 81). Falwell
thus brought fundamentalists and other literal-
ist Protestants out of their position of political
exclusion (both self-exclusion and rejection
from dominant political organizations) and
propelled them into national politics as major
players. This conglomerate group of conserva-
tive Christians has been a significant force ever
since. Also integral to their recent central place
in U.S. politics was thecombiningof conserva-
tive religious voices against homosexuality,
abortion, pornography, the Equal Rights
Amendment, and media violence and in sup-
port oi teaching creation science in public
schools. During the 1950s and 1960s, Falwell
and other fundamentalists spoke in favor of ra-
cial segregation. Harding shows how these po-
sitions have softened somewhat si nee the crea-
tion of the Moral Majority, particularly in
Falwell's discourse.
Harding spends considerable time on doc-
trine so that readers can understand complexi-
ties in reconfiguring key elements oi scripture
and fundamentalist tradition. For example,
"Longstanding Christian folk theories of his-
tory—various premillennialisms that envision
the return of jesus Christ to rule a one thou-
sand-year kingdom—were variously deployed
to refashion the end time, that is, current his-
tory, as a time for worldly Christian activism"
(p. 80). Given the data that Harding provides, I
would say that Falwell's use of Bible stories
and apocalyptic prophecy almost replace the
belief in an end time that would end all history
with end times that are always (over and over
again) just around the corner. His last days are
a way of being, a constant culture of renewed
apocalypse and millennium. That is one of the
reasons fundamentalism of Falwell's sort has
become a powerful political force; if he and his
flock were to believe the end was near, they
might not organize politically. Like Jehovah's
Witnesses, they might prefer to leave Caesar's
things to Caesar. Harding says it well: "Bible
prophecy as it is practiced in everyday life is
not so much a system or set of religious beliefs
as it is a narrative mode of knowing current his-
tory. . . . Popular apocalypticism . . . is a kind
oi narrative politics that contests the dominant
secular or modern voices of journalists and
academics for control over the definition and
meaning of current events and of history more
broadly" (pp. 233-234).
Yet there is evidence in Falwell's theology
that the message of the apocalypse also points
to linear history and the End of all ends:
Here was Falwell's signature innovation in
the Bible prophecy revisions of the 1980s: in
order to do the only thing Bible prophecy
prescribed them to do in the end-times,
namely, spread the gospel to the fourcorners
of the world, Christians must do more than
that. . . . He argued that unless born-again
Christians acted politically they would lose
their 'freedom,' religious and political,
which was what enabled them to spread the
good news at home and abroad, that is, to
fulfill Bible prophecy. . . . World history is
hopelessly regressive, careening pell-mell
into Satan's maw, and it may seem as if
America is plummeting down the same dark
tunnel, but, not necessarily, not if Christians
act now (p. 244).
Harding sees both repetitive or cyclical time
and linear time at work in Falwell's rhetoric:
"Christians continue to operate according to a
specifically antimodern causal logic, one more
divine than human. . . . Both Satan and God
are winning, and Christians are double agents,
at once inside and outside, the history of the fu-
ture" (pp. 245-246). Bible stories happen over
and over again as returnings of the non-
repressed (the hyperconscientized) until such
cyclical sacred history arrives at the end times
and the faithful can draw linear traces up the
spiral of repetition. These fundamentalisms,
literalisms, and apocalyptic practices are
firmly rooted in the histories and basic cultural
units of the societies in which they operate.
Harding finds herself still vulnerable to the
"exclusionary forces at work" in Falwell's
rhetoric (p. 1 f>5). "His reasoning struck me
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as . . . unreasonable, irrational. I could not
avoid thinking that he sounded self-right-
eous, intolerant, and judgmental. In short, I
was undergoing a modern, or liberal, reac-
tion to fundamentalism. I was reacting to the
militancy of Falwell's language, to the very
quality that distinguishes more moderate
Christians and non-Christians from funda-
mentalists" (pp. 165-166).
Although Falwell's discourse excludes liberals
of all hues and religious appurtenance, it also,
by its rhetorical style, unintentionally renders
itself unpalatable to many more conservative
Christians and ethnic minorities who other-
wise would have found themselves on Fal-
well's side politically. Harding holds that
Falwell's speech forms and content identify his
ministry as white—and not otherwise—and as
unmistakably male centered (p. 166). Yet that
very tone endears Falwell to his vast congrega-
tion. His sins and his confessions are as important
to his fundamentalist charisma as are his good-
ness, his uprightness, and his penchant for self-
sacrifice. Even his troubles with finances and
the law, and accusations of intemperance and
dishonesty, somehow bind Falwell's followers
to him by increasing his charisma—by point-
ing to the uniqueness of his character and his
abject dependence upon God to keep him, a
mere mortal, leading his flock (p. 87).
TedKoppel's 1988 effort to unmask televan-
gelism, including that of Falwell and the popu-
lar Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker, did not quite
meet its mark. Hardi ng writes that Koppel "pro-
duced a bald caricature of social-scientific ex-
planation, one that undermined his own osten-
sible detachment, that inspired a cascade of
mixed metaphors, wild intertextualities, and
backtalk from his guests, and began to erase
the very distinction between him and them
which he had to establish in order to have any
authority at all" (pp. 252-253). The TV preach-
ers were more than simple opposites oi the
likesof Ted Koppel, a supposed exemplar of ra-
tional media social critique. They were players
in a particular forum of modernity with its own
highly rational strategy:
Far from being premodern relics, atavisms of
an earlier age, the televangelists were a late
capitalist (rossbreed of symbolic production,
consumption, and social reproduction.
They were harbingers of an emerging politi-
cal economic order in which the stakes were
collective identities, cultural ideas, and
symbols as well as profits, markets, political
power, and lost souls . . . Falwell was Mr.
Modern Fundamentalism and Bakker was
Mr. Postmodern Pentecostal ism" (p. 258).
How does biblical-Falwellian narrative con-
struct the basis for belief and practice for the
faithful? How docs Falwell's "goingaround the
mountain" for seven days reenact the ancient
Hebrews' circling of Jericho and thus reen-
chant the world for the faithful? How does
repetition of the word'm the form of stories and
the recreation of events create fundamental
cognitive crisis or communitas for members of
the religious community? My interpretation of
Harding's answers to these questions is that
speaking sacred repetition ad infinitum carries
out the specific task of maintaining and recre-
atingdiscourses and practices of a thrilling bib-
lical uncanny that overpowers the gray secular
certainties of modernity. It makes the heimlich
unheimlich, over and over again. Yet the lead-
ers of these commu nities employ the very capi-
talist strategies, in all their rational modernity,
that have become so canny in the service of a
spiritually enchanted premodern, yet modern,
future. (Here I am turning the modernist un-he-
imlich on its head, treating it as familiarly dusty
and boring in its production of anxiety, heim-
lich in its own way; whereas it is theexcitement
of the end time and millennium that colors the
world desirably unheimlich, calling fora tran-
scendence of the homely.)
Adam Lutzker. Harding utilizes recent de-
velopments in social theory (the performative
turn associated with Judith Butler and post-
thick description ethnography) to enter into,
make sense of, and report back on, the cultural
practices that make up Jerry Falwell's institu-
tionally powerful brand of Christian funda-
mentalism. This performative turn has been
used by Kathleen Stewart (1996) and Elizabeth
M. Taylor (1992), both students of Harding, to
recover the lost agency and "world making"
(Heidegger 1962, pp. 80, 189) capabilities of
socially marginalized peoples in the coal
(amps of Appalachia. They use storytelling
and other communal social practices to resist
cultural hegemony, constructing social worlds
and collective identities at odds with the domi-
nant cultural assumptions and social identifi-
cations oi modern America. Harding shows
that the same tools can be used to analyze the
world of the Christian conservative, but, tor
this reader at least, the results in this case were
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unsettling. The political economies of the coal
camps and Falwell's congregation differ sig-
nificantly. Residents of the coal camps respond
to economic marginality and dislocation,
whilethe members of Falwell'schurch include
affluent suburbanites. While the residents of
the coal camps are constructing an opposi-
tional social theoretical and political eco-
nomic discourse, the members of Falwell's
church are constructing a justificationist ideol-
ogy that legitimates professional lifestyles,
conspicuous consumption, a notion of social
responsibility limited to social regulation and
control, and an adventurist American foreign
policy. When Harding emphasizes the agency
of Falwell's congregation in constructing a lo-
cal social world she foregrounds the amount
of ideological heterogeneity within modern
American culture and challenges groups at-
tached to the Utopian imaginary to match the
Christian Right's practical and poetic suc-
cesses in world building. But the general strat-
egy of recovering lost agency seems less ap-
pealing here since the political right seems to
have plenty of agency already.
My critique of the fundamentalist social
imaginary turns on its life-denying regulations
of self-creation (Crapanzano's fieldwork, pre-
sented in chapter 2 of Serving the Word, exam-
ines the restrictions placed on acceptable be-
havior and emotion by fundamentalist social
norms and highlights their human costs) and its
presumed universalist scope. Several types of
repressions seem to play out here, particularly
in the attempt by fundamentalist communities
to regulate psychosocial affect and in various
religious and political unconscious adher-
ences that operate at a visceral level. This pro-
duces an inevitable return of the repressed, in
which the drives, practices, affects, and behav-
iors being regulated go underground; but
rather than disappearing, they emerge in a new
way (see Freud 1950 and Foucault 1980 on the
"return of the repressed"). Harding and Cra-
panzano analyze strategies of repression used
by the various religious groups; Hall provides
examples of the consequences of this repression.
You point out that repetition generates the
experience of the unheimlich for Falwell's
people. I read Harding as isolating the method
in Falwell's production of the unheimlich in a
rourinized form. Falwell thus takes his place
within a larger group of social actors involved
in the capitalist production of the unheimlich
experience. This becomes the ultimate form of
consumerism—consuming unsettling experi-
ences that return some magic to drabber expe-
riences of capitalist modernity. Here is another
point of contact between the religious right and
the broader culture. Other subcultures get their
dose of the unheimlich in other ways (listening
to alternative music, engaging in countercul-
ture activities, reading Heidegger or poststruc-
turalism), but the underlying motivation and
the structuring principle of the experience is (I
infer) much the same across these subcultures.
I am quite taken with your quote from Hard-
ing (p. 258) about the emerging political econ-
omy surrounding the cultural production of
collective identities (in which Falwell and
Koppel are coworkers). It would be nice to
have some more points of entry into the litera-
ture analyzing this new political economy of
culture (see Frow 1997; Harvey 1989; Jameson
1991; Lash and Urry 1994). Its essential feature
is experiencing the unheimlich as both the raw
material input and the finished product output.
In this political economy, value is added by
transforming a scary and lonely mood into a
safer, collective, and cathartic experience.
This transformation is the glue that constructs
collective identities and generates emotional
attachments to them. It is also the driving force
behind cultural production and consumption
and a crucial sector for understanding eco-
nomic development.
serving the word: literalism as a social
control strategy
Adam Lutzker. Crapanzano presents his
topic as inquiry into a particular philosophy of
language or interpretive style that he labels lit-
eralism. He lists ten features of literalism on
pages 2 and 3 of his text. In brief, these features
imply that words have simple meanings that
generate unambiguous meanings of texts that
are equivalent to authorial intention. Conse-
quently, meaning is clear, stable, and inde-
pendent of context. Crapanzano generates a
long and interesting list of examples of literal-
ism in his preface: Christian fundamentalism,
conservative understandings of the law, popu-
larized versions of psychoanalysis and genet-
ics, the discourse of identity politics, mechani-
cal understandings of Marxism, and positivist
philosophy of language. Unfortunately, he de-
cides to study only the first two examples. This
limits the book's sc ope to two overlapping, poli-
tically conservative communities of discourse
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and prevents readers from exploring the urge to
stabilize interpretation closer to home, that is,
in movements that the academic intelligentsia
might be more sympathetic to on political or
cultural grounds. It also prevents Crapanzano
and readers from addressing broader ques-
tions, such as whether or in what ways literal-
ism is inherently politically or epistemo-logi-
ca I ly conservative.
Crapanzano, in essence, analyzes the logi-
cal inconsistencies of literalism along with de-
tailed discussions of the strategies for manag-
ing these inconsistencies and their social
consequences. He views society "as a field of
competing interpretive styles" (p. 1). Social ac-
tion is coordinated by various "strategies for
managing different interpretations" (p. 1). Lit-
eralism is a strategy for the uncritical reaffirma-
tion of existing interpretive frames. It represses
ambiguity of meaning and social conflicts over
interpretation in favor of a constructed tradi-
tional or obvious meaning. Its founding gesture
is a form of bad faith that denies its performa-
tive political function. Interpretive regimes are
modes of governance; literalism is a form of so-
cial control.
Crapanzano lays out his overall project and
presents a capsule history of theories of lan-
guage and hermeneutics in an excellent intro-
ductory chapter. At almost every turn, he op-
poses his own understanding of language to
the literalist understanding. He foregrounds
the expressivist and pragmatic uses of lan-
guage over the referential; the role of context
and convention in stabilizing meaning; a
moral view of signification as a contractual ob-
ligation between speakers; and the importance
of the performative function of language, espe-
cially in the canonical foundation texts such as
the Bible and the Constitution, that are so im-
portant to these conservative literalists.
Crapanzano devotes the first half of his book
to Christian fundamentalism. His presentation
of the history and theology of fundamentalism
in the first chapter is mainly an intellectual his-
tory oi how conservative theologians have at-
tempted to deal with the problems of biblical
interpretation in their project of extracting a
consistent, unambiguous meaning from the
text. In the second chapter, Crapanzano dis-
cusses fundamentalist practice—the applica-
tion of the doctrine to everyday life. This section
is based on fieldwork conducted predomi-
nantly in southern California since 1995. In the
third chapter, he looks at fundamentalist views
of history and time. "The literalist under-
standing gives at least the illusion oi stopping
time and history by projecting (a notion of)
meaningthat transcends time" (p. xxiv). The lit-
eralist project fails in creating this illusion, Cra-
panzano argues, because the changing con-
text affects meaning.
Comparing Crapanzano's fundamentalists
to Harding's analysis of Jerry Falwell's success
reveals a contradiction between fundamental-
ists' literalist linguistic ideology and their per-
formative linguistic practice. Interestingly, the
fundamentalists seem to share a lot ideologi-
cally with the broader modern American cul-
ture even though they see themselves as rebel-
ling against it. /n addition to this literalist
ideology, which Crapanzano hints is wide-
spread in American culture, fundamentalists
also share a dominant cultural notion of expe-
rience as understood by positivism, scientism,
or empiricism, rather than the broader notion
oi experience found in mysticisms oi various
sorts.4 They believe in science, as understood
by 19th-century materialism, and they think
the Bible isscientific. Fundamentalism is possi-
ble within modernity only because it is a mix-
ture of modernist elements. Its claim to be anti-
modern is part of its basic mystification of its
own ideological status.
An analysis of the details of scientific literal-
ism would broaden Crapanzano's work, al-
lowing readers to see the literalist strategy at
work in a contextdistinct from political conser-
vatism. It would also allow readers insight into
the debates over the status of science—debates
in which the defenders of science attack their
critics as irrationalists while appealing to the
same literalist strategies for controlling inter-
pretive communities of discourse that Crapan-
zano analyzes among the fundamentalists.5
Crapanzano does utilize the hermeneutic
circle in the introduction to Serving the Word,
so he would presumably accept that all dis-
courses are circular, that is, they cannot justify
their fundamental vocabulary to those outside
who are not willing to grant the discourse its
performative force. Is he not conscious of the
thinness of his argument against the circularity
of fundamentalist discourse? Crapanzano's
hermeneutics should lead him to expect that
every discourse is circular—that is, it makes
sense to those within it who ignore its constitu-
tive repressions of its contradictions, and it
seems obviously flawed to those outside it who
see the contradictions. Crapanzano has a
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too-reductive notion of literalism. Literalism
can mean different things depending on one's
notion of experience. It is only literalism about
language combined with a scientistic notion of
experience that produces the modern American
conservative type of literalism that Crapanzano
opposes. As Rosenthal suggests earlier, if
Crapanzano were to broaden his focus, he
would find other examples of literalism, espe-
cially non-Western ones, that do not fit his
framework.
In his discussion of legal literalism, Crapan-
zano does a nice job of exposing the necessar-
ily performative element in literalist Supreme
Court ideology. Through close analysis of the
language oi the Constitution, the Marbury v.
Mad/son decision that establishes the principle
oi Supreme Court review of legislation for its
consistency with the constitution, and the re-
vival of original intent as an interpretive princi-
ple in the 1970s, Crapanzano establishes the
interpretive inconsistency of legal literalism,
its willful "epistemological naivete" (p. 260),
and its entanglement in the same contradic-
tions as religious literalism. He skillfully util-
izes the attackon intentional explanation in lit-
erary criticism to argue the futility of attempts
to isolate a clear, authorial intention in matters
of law (pp. 287-303). Finally, he analyzes the
legal invocation of binding precedent, show-
i ng it to be yet another form of bad faith that dis-
guises agentic choice as logical necessity. All
in all, Crapanzano's chapters on law are emo-
tionally cathartic for this reader, particularly as
they dismantle the arguments oi jurists such as
Robert Bork, Anthony Scalia, and their intel-
lectual kin. My only comments are that Cra-
panzano understates the motivational signifi-
cance of the Warren Court in general, and
Brown v. Board of Education in particular, for
the literalist turn among conservative legal
scholars and that he could profitably explore
the relationship between his own under-
standing of language and that of scholars in the
Critical Legal Studies movement, who share
his stance toward legal literalism.6
Judy Rosenthal: I particularly enjoyed
Serving the Word. Crapanzano tacks back and
forth between careful ethnographic relativism
and political meditation about what all this
fundamentalism must mean today and what
sort of attitudes we politically progressive intel-
lectuals can have towards it. He confesses his
inability to sympathize with their lack of rela-
tivism. Crapanzano's fundamentalist subjects
are different from Harding's: "They disap-
proved of mixing religion and politics, of ex-
ploitative and hate-provoking preaching, and
of irresponsible healing. They looked askance
at organizations like the Christian Coalition
(though I suspect most of them vote along coa-
lition lines). They were so certain of their val-
ues—and so isolated, morally and spiritually,
from mainstream America—that they could
not understand why anyone with different val-
ues would be angered by their incapacity, their
unwillingness, to engage in dialogue or de-
bate. . . . Theirs was a preclusive discourse:
they had the truth" (p. 325). In contrast, many
of the legal literalists—"people in high places
with enormous power"—hid the religious na-
ture oi their political certainties; they em-
ployed their supposedly purely intellectual lit-
eralism as "an alibi to mask personal and
political interests and agendas" (p. 326).
Crapanzano admits he was more ethno-
graphic in writing about the fundamentalists
than about the Supreme Court literalists (p.
326). His book is part ethnography, in the strict
sense, and part political and social critique of a
powerful element in Supreme Court proceed-
ings. Although Crapanzano admits failure to
shed his disapproval of fundamentalists' lile-
denying asceticism, he does manage to like
many fundamentalists. Even so, he admits, "I
did not really become friends with any of
them—I couldn't. It was as though God came
between us" (p. 328). On the other hand, Cra-
panzano does not even try to warm to the liter-
alism of the legal minds. That form oi funda-
mentalism—which does not speak its true
name (it does not confess to its religious ba-
sis)—asks for hostile critique. In an attempt to
explain this uneven treatment, he writes that
anthropologists "take belief to be a privileged
domain, so deeply personal as to be untouch-
able . . . the effect oi our own particular chiv-
alry toward belief and faith [and] that accounts
for some of the differences between my chap-
ters on religions and law" (p. 329).
apocalypse observed—terrible faith
versus the state
Judy Rosenthal: Although Apocalypse Ob-
served written by sociologists, is a cultural study,
of the three books it is the least centered on lan-
guage. Hall, Schuyler, and Trinh examine the
ways ideological opposition to religious move-
ments and efforts to control them, including
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state violence, push their adherents in the di-
rection of violent behavior. They focus on five
religious orders—the Peoples Temple of Jones-
town, the Branch Davidians in Waco,
Heaven's Gate, the Solar Temple, and Aum
Shrinrikyo. The first four groups ended with
collective suicides, and the last performed
murder and terrorism. Anticult activists, con-
cerned relatives, news media, and the state
participate in an escalation of tension and fi-
nally violence against and by deviant religious
groups. These groups are clearly products oi
the societies they reject, often mirroring more
widely held fears and hopes.
The nearly 1,000 members of the settlement
of the Peoples Temple in Jonestown, Guyana,
lived communally in the spirit of a "leftist po-
litical vein of crude communism" (p. 1 7), shar-
ing work and production, childcare, and the
life of a hugely extended spiritual family. Their
leader and prophet, jim Jones, "connected to
the legacy of blacks' search for redemption in
the United States . . . as part of a higher relig-
ious purpose to history" (p. 20). The Peoples'
Temple was an effort "to escape the degrada-
tion of racism and class inequality in the
United States" (p. 20). Opposition from the
U.S. government, the press, and numerous
relatives oi members catalyzed the collective
suicide of 913 members of the Peoples Temple
and their murder of five outsiders. Hall argues
that the state and other opponents created a
myth of Jonestown, "the story . . . of a sick and
fiendish man who plotted the deaths oi those
who would expose his sham community," and
whose followers were "too naive or powerless
to break the hold of jim Jones . . ." (p. 16). Hall
claims that a fairer interpretation ot the events
and the culture of the Peoples Temple would
also critique their opponents: "The collectiv-
ism of countercultural organizations flies in the
face oi the dominant American ideology that
embraces capitalism, individualism, and the
nuclear family, and it is thus vulnerable to be-
coming coded as antidemocratic and subver-
sive" (p. 17). In fact, Jim Jones' organization
turns out to have been "a left-wing religious
movement dedicated to racial integration," (p.
16) to living a life over and against dominant
capitalist culture "by radicalizing the social
gospel through a congregational communal
formula of 'apostolic socialism' and direct so-
cial ministry, combined with a leftist political
agenda in the wider society" (p. 27). Members
of the Peoples Temple eventually went so far as
to commit "revolutionary suicide," a concept
articulated by Black Panther Huey Newton
(p. 28).
Hall insists that "Government authorities in
the United States have a long tradition of using
the state's monopoly on the legitimate deploy-
ment of violence to control Utopian social
movements" (p. 66). His chapter about the
Branch Davidians in Waco and their 1993
standoff with the FBI further demonstrates his
thesis that the state is virtually always involved
in the debacle oi mass suicide. When con-
cerned relatives were unable to rescue their
family members from the Waco community,
their accusations of child abuse helped pro-
vide legitimization for an armed assault by the
FBI. But, in fact, there was no clear evidence of
childabusethat might rationallycreatesuchan
emergency (p. 69). The fire that consumed the
Branch Davidians would not have occurred
had the FBI not attacked. Hall makes the spe-
cific point that these groups experienced state
power as overwhelming in both its display of
violent intentions during the catastrophic
events and its ability to dismantle and destroy
the targeted communities.
Hall also takes to task one-sided coverage by
the press, which adds oil to the fire by de-
monizing cults in stories of "cult-busting" that
"follow the genre of the heroic expose" (p. 71).
First Amendment rights may not be respected
when a religious group is the suspect—the
government, the press, and groups organized
to destroy cults (including relatives of cult
members) take sides militantly in matters of re-
ligion. In addition, at Waco "the BATF [Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms) itself was
not simply driven by the anticultism of the cul-
tural opponents. It had itsown institutionalized
tradition as something of a wild-west outfit, de-
fending the state's monopoly over the legiti-
mate means of violence" (p. 74).
The case of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan was
fundamentally different from that of the Peo-
ples Temple and the Branch Davidians. Aum
Shinrikyo is a religion that has brought together
elements of Buddhism, Hinduism, and various
syncretic sects that began to sweep Japan during
the 1980s. It has included numerous young
adults, many of (hem technicians and profes-
sionals. Some lived in highly ascetic commu-
nities withdrawn from the rest of society in an
effort to reach enlightenment and to head off
the impending doom prophesied by Nostra-
damus. Aum Shinrikyo determined to save
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humanity from disaster by changing the way
people lived.
In 1990, the leader Asahara Shoko and 25
disciples entered the political world through
presenting themselves as candidates for legis-
lative elections, but they received very few
votes. This political failure may have triggered
the apocalyptic turn in Aum Shinrikyo that cul-
minated in their 1995 Tokyo subway gas attack
resulting in the death of 12 people and medical
treatment of 5,510 persons. Hall interprets
these events as a reaction to impending law-
suits and investigations by state agents precipi-
tated, in part, by Asahara Shoko's contracting
the deaths of several members who threatened
to leave the sect. Aum Shinrikyo members
were guilty of murder but were never involved
in mass suicide.
Trinh and Hall analyze public reaction to
the sect before the terrorist event: "The fear and
stigma surrounding Aum Shinrikyo may not
have come so much from confronting some-
thing beyond comprehension as from looking
at a distorted mirror image of Japanese society
that people found uncomfortably under-
standable" (p. 110). They take to task the edu-
cational system, and by extension modem
Japanese culture, for lack of social critique:
"Schools replicated standardized knowledge
but created human automatons who lacked
the capacity to think outside bounded informa-
tion games. So long as these automatons found
places within the existing social order, things
went smoothly. But when they took up life in a
countercultural movement, they easily suc-
cumbed to its discipline and demands" (p. 81).
In their analysis of francophone examples of
apocalyptic violence, Hall and Schuyler write
that the Solar Temple "is a hybrid that tran-
scends neat modern distinctions between sci-
ence and religion, reason and faith, spirit and
sexuality, technology and popular culture"
(p. 126). They describe Swiss, French, and
Canadian manifestations of the Solar Temple
(all of which were connected) as a countercul-
tural movement attracting intellectuals and in-
dividuals who were economically privileged
and politically connected, including, for ex-
ample, a French nuclear engineer, close rela-
tives of powerful industrialists, an orchestra
conductor, a mayor, and an official in the
Quebec Ministry oi Finance. Inspired by the
Knights Templar of the 12th and 13th centuries
and by Rosicrucian goals of saving humanity
from "the error of death" (p. 119), adherents
believed that ecological apocalypse would re-
sult from the emotional and spiritual pollution
common to the human race. To escape from
this "kingdom of fire," they offered a "mystical
mood"—a rite of passage enabling an encoun-
ter with the divine (pp. 125-126). Members of
the Solar Temple believed in transcendence oi
earthly existence and a spiritual transit to other
time-spaces, eventually to Sirius, a "Dimen-
sion of Truth and the Absolute" (pp. 136-137).
In 1994, after the group became convinced
that it was misunderstood by the world and
persecuted by state authorities, 48 members
were found dead in two Swiss communities.
Their notes indicated this was no ordinary sui-
cide; it was a transit to another dimension.
Even so, that all of the deceased transited vol-
untarily remains to be proven. Similar circum-
stances claimed the lives of five in Quebec, in-
cluding a woman and infant who clearly did
not transit of their own volition. A year later, 16
members of the Solar Temple transited to-
gether in France, as did five more in Quebec in
1997.
What could possibly persuade these indi-
viduals to align themselves with such a sect
and eventually to kill themselves (and others)
in this way? Hall and Schuyler's evocative de-
scription holds that "in a world beset by secular
influences even within the Church itself, the
Temple Solaire resurrected enchantment" and
"its principle innovation—erasing the firm
boundary between life and death—resonates
with similar religious ideas" oi other groups
that are " 'Utopian' in the specific sense that
their ascendancy on a wide scale would entail
a dramatic reordering of culture, power, and
social relations" (p. 127). This, indeed, is pow-
erful enchantment.
In his chapter on Heaven's Gate, Hall de-
scribes a group oi believers more reluctant to
be violent toward others, but who killed them-
selves because they were so sensitive to the
outrage of their opponents and the general in-
difference of the world to their urgent message.
"They took their own lives as an affirmation of
faith that by this act they would be physically
transported to Heaven" (p. 182). The group's
original leaders, Bo and Peep, whom Hall calls
"New-Age Puritans" (p. 152), began a spiritual
partnership in the early seventies. They
preached and practiced an extreme asceti-
cism, determined to withdraw from the world
of spiritual darkness and convinced God had
given them an "overwhelming mission" (p. 152),
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revealing to them an apocalypse soon to hit the
earth. They were to recruit as many believers as
possible and lead them away from the impend-
ing doom "aboard a spacecraft ('cloud of light')
at the completion of their 'overcoming'" (p.
154). This was to be a long journey to the "Next
Level" of evolutionary development. Few peo-
ple took their mission and their warnings seri-
ously. This lack of concern brought pain to the
couple, but over the years they built up a small
community. By 1997, 39 members lived to-
gether in Rancho Santa Fe, California. Hearing
of the nearing of the Hale-Bopp comet, they
decided to join it and purchased a telescope to
see the spaceship accompanying the comet.
They videotaped good-byes, enjoyed movies
and pizzas, gathered passports, money, and a
few personal items, then took phenobarbital
and drank vodka. Assistants placed plastic
bags over their heads, then followed suit.
Heaven's Gate, less affected by state threats
than other groups in this volume, did not en-
gage in violent actions of self-protection.
In spite of significant differences between
these five religious orders and the violence
they suffered or enacted, Hall finds they are all
"analogic variations on one cultural structure:
the warring apocalypse of religious conflict"
(p. 189). He holds that these groups formed
"paranoid communities" and that paranoia
was just as essential to the forces opposing
them—forces that sought to employ the social
order against those who would endanger it (p.
196). Discussing Durkheim and recent writers
on moral boundaries and "exemplary dual-
ism" (p. 197), Hall theorizes the relationship of
these groups and events to modernity: "Ritual
work that distinguishes an existing social order
from alien Others can be undertaken either as a
holding action against the rise oi modernity or
in order to defend modernity" (p. 197). He dis-
cusses the Puritan revulsion for uncertainty
and disorder, the Nazi use of technology at its
most modern, and the disciplined character of
the Holocaust. "Notwithstanding the brutal
character that repressions ot the Other can
take, it would thus be mistaken to assume that
modern societies have been purged of the
techniques of such repression or the capacity
and will to use them" (p. 197). He also argues
that states are in an impossible impasse—to the
extent that they control acts oi violence on the
part ot apocalyptic groups, they themselves
become violent players in end time scenarios
(p. 200).
Doesmillenarianism necessarily end in vio-
lence? No—miflenarian beliefs and practices
are products of "normal society" in the United
States and in Europe (p. 200). And the violence
of some millenarian groups is not the result of
their internal tensions or an expression of their
basic nature; state intervention is the direct
cause of violence, or it triggers desperately vio-
lent self-defense strategies in groups who inter-
pret their world as a dispensation perched on
the brink of apocalypse.
Hall, Schuyler, and Trinh have made an out-
standing contribution to the political analysis
of millenarian groups.
Adam Lutzker. I agree that of most interest
here are similarities between cults and main-
stream society. The cults form their world
views by isolating, in a purified form, elements
of broader, society-wide ideologies. Hall does
a nice job oi mapping the world views of the
cults back onto the broader social landscape.
He also locates the responsibility for violence
with the state. The ensuing violence results
from a state-social response of (mis)recogni-
tion and repression. This provides examples of
the return of the repressed mentioned above
and explains why politicized messianic escha-
tology is such a dangerous mix.
bringing it all back home (to our usual
concerns and anxieties, disciplinary
and political)
Judy Rosenthal: These works, and Crapan-
zano's Serving the Word in particular, inspire a
number of questions that are not (nor could
they be) entirely answered in their pages, and
certainly not in this review. What do funda-
mentalist literalism and the repetition of bibli-
cal narrative (that facilitates identity) have to
do with metaphor and metonymy, or with rep-
resentation of the sacred? Does Christian liter-
alism completely refuse metaphor? After all,
these Protestant believers do mark a difference
between signifiers, or the Word, and the signi-
fied.
What do these questions have to do with
identity politics—with the strategic necessity
of identity politics (or, for political fundamen-
talists, its literal material factual ness), as well as
its inherent wrongness epistemologically and
with respect to the goals oi social justice (for
some readers, the ideal of radical democracy)?
How is the aporia (or logical impasse) inherent in
identity politics, both as strategy and as doctrine,
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linked to literalism and the resisting potentials
of millennial groups? It is through a radical
identity politics that some of the groups exam-
ined by Hall have resisted the state.
Is not sectarianism, or the adherence to a
monistic version of truth, the culprit rather than
literalism with respect to apocalyptic violence
as well as the conservatism of literalism? ("We
are the only ones who possess and wield the
Truth," all of these groups appear to say.) Some
versions of literalism arguably can translate
into a new mix oi modernity with reenchant-
ment.
Epistemological monism and historical mo-
nism are two very different concepts and phe-
nomena, and both are entirely relevant to the
subject at hand. Does not the trope of literalism
have different meanings in different contexts?
The concept is less stable in both academic
and popular language than Crapanzano's use
of it seems to imply—he takes literalism too lit-
erally. Crapanzano tells his story in a manner
not altogether unlike the moral outrage of the
literalist fundamentalists he describes.
What are the millenarian or fundamentalist
aspects of the U.S. government, politics, and
culture (the Constitution, the Supreme Court,
and so on) that have become so secularly sec-
ond nature that they no longer appear to have
metaphysical or religious moorings? Given
that Crapanzano finds literalism in the dis-
course of U.S. Supreme Court justices—a liter-
alism quite linked to fundamentalist religious
literalism—might he not find it in ever so many
other sites and positions linked to the state?
What about the possibility of a curious rela-
tionship between literalism and fetishism? Is
the fetish the most literal literalism imaginable?
Reading Crapanzano, readers may imagine
that literalism of the biblical and constitutional
word takes meaning as something that can be
peeled from the page, as though it were stuck
face to face with the text or with a particular
historical intentionality that is foundational
and unchanging—as though the oral reciting
of these texts provides a palpable origin of truth
in the air, a material reproduction of an older
original. Literal vodus and other fetishes are,
among other things, congealed words—speech
made concrete and history made material in
condensed form.
I take this Vodu literalism to be very different
from the literalism Crapanzano attdc ks, al-
though I recognize that the Word, <is well as
original intention, are fetishized in some sense
by religious and constitutional fundamental-
ists. Yet there is something to pick at in the
comparison. Unlike religious fundamentalists,
the carriers of Vodu literalism do not imagine
themselves to possess The Truth—they are in-
sistently pluralistic and theological relativists.
Literalism is not necessarily intolerant and
closed—West African fetishists (literalists?) are
radically open, and their divination system is
open ended in its interpretive repertoire. The
most literal, concrete, or materialist mode of
all—the literally fetishistic—may be the most
abstract and open to the outside, to new coup-
lings and juxtapositions.
How are literalism and Vodu materialism or
fetishistic concretism distinguishable? Vodu
materialism is the refusal of the opposition be-
tween the material and the nonmaterial (or
whatever is opposed to the literal material)—
metaphor, the ideal, the symbolic, the spiri-
tual, the Word, or language. It is text, or Word,
all the way down in Vodu. Each of the material
and spiritual ingredients in the making of the
fetish is a text put in contact with other little bits
of text—together, they light the fires of inter-
pretation, and there is no end in sight as far as
meaning goes. This is a metonymy rather than
a relationshipof metaphor. Such fetishism is far
from the literalism of Christian fundamentalists
and Supreme Court judges who, after all, be-
lieve that language and its referents (or signifi-
ers and signifieds) are of different orders.
(Or do they?)
Adam Lutzker and Judy Rosenthal: Hard-
ing and Crapanzano seem to be telling readers
that the fundamentalism of which they write is
not always about belief in end times in the
strictest linear sense. Intheirexamples, the end
times are always just around the corner. Being
in end times is a way of being, rather than a
doctrine about the literal end of the world. Be-
cause Christian fundamentalism is a constantly
reproduced and reconfigured culture of
apocalypse and millennium, jerry Falwell was
able to politicize it and create the Moral Major-
ity, extracting the antiworldly or antimodernist
strain from Christian fundamentalism. Had
Falwell and his flock really believed the battle
oi Armageddon to be near, as do Jehovah's
Witnesses, he would not have been able to
convince his followers to acquire university
educations and enter the professions in a sort of
fifth-column politics—to infiltrate the secular
world in order to seek out the sheep trapped
in it, thereby providing Christians with such
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improvements as Christian psychology, medi-
cine, history, and teacher training. This aban-
doning of traditional political isolationism (that
Jehovah's Witnesses have never abandoned)
propelled the religious right into a position of
major political influence, including a heavy
hand in the 2000 presidential election.
Politically active fundamentalists may see
the United States as on God's side, or Christ as
leading the country in a worldwide battle
against evil. For this reason, and to the extent
that fundamentalists take a final (linear) end
time seriously, the United States would be
saved during the coming apocalypse. It is not
clear whether fundamentalists' concern is to
ensure that all U.S. citizens would be saved, or
only all Christian U.S. citizens. Nor is it clear
whether the saved would immediately ascend
to heaven or live out the millennium on a Uto-
pian earth. In any case, if Christians do their
part and U.S. citizens join the ranks of the
saved, their actions can make the United States
worthy of election. These religious leaders
have invented a peculiarly American mixture
of nationalism, consumerism, and millennial
rel igion—they poi nt out good versus evi I in for-
eign policy, America's grand role in the world,
and the spiritual transformative effects of con-
sumerism. Consumerism marks this brand of
millenarianism as fundamentally different
from many religious movements of the past. It
is precisely this intriguing mix that makes such
movements so effective in marketing their views.
Adam Lutzker. My general response to
reading these three books is that we secular
leftists need to analyze the fissures in our own
world view. I fear that the urge to literalism and
associated forms of regulation also affect social
groups that appear far more liberal than Chris-
tian fundamentalists. I have expressed disap-
pointment with Crapanzano's book because
his keen analysis of literalism is restricted to
two case studies of the far right. Because I criti-
cize Crapanzano for not putting his subject po-
sition in question, it is only fair to put mine on
the line. Secularism as a world view depends
on a distinction between a public and private,
a distinction between the right and the good, a
misrecognition oi the sources of subjectivity,
and a slippage between its own partisan vo-
cabulary and a neutral framework for resolving
social conflicts.7 The public and private dis-
tinction grows out of an attempt by the signato-
ries of the Treaty ot Westphalia in 1648 to dis-
tinguish political and religious authority in the
17th century and the emergence, in Enlighten-
ment thought, of an autonomous political-
economic realm governed by reason. The dis-
tinction between right action, about which
liberalism required consensus, and the good
life, about which it did not, followed from this
fissuring of the social world into public and pri-
vate spheres. This uneasy divide has been sub-
ject to renegotiation—public discourses of so-
cial control have been aimed at the private
sphere for at least the last 200 years. Michel
Foucault's (1977, 1980, 1991) genealogies of
discipline, biopower, and governmentality
narrate this encroachment of the public into
the private. Post-Enlightenment thinkers ac-
count for emotional identifications with the
symbolic order. Secularism identifies subjec-
tivity with rationality, but the trend oi post-
Enlightenment thought is to see subjectivity as
a surface phenomenon driven by deeper proc-
esses of which it is, at best, only partially
aware. Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and
Sigmund Freud—Paul Ricoeur's (1970) mas-
ters of suspicion—are the founding fathers
here, but poststructuralists have continued to
develop this insight. Connolly (2000) refers to
these underlying sources oi affectivity as the
"visceral register" (p. 164). Lastly, secularism
conflates its own theoretical vocabulary and
metaphysical commitments with the require-
ments ot neutral political adjudication of com-
peting claims. Hence, jiirgen Habermas's
(1987) cranky response to Nietzsche and his
followers in which he effectively says: I can
make no sense of your discourse from within
my own philosophical commitments, so I con-
clude that you are unreasonable. This repres-
sion of difference, instead of discursive en-
gagement with it, reveals the dogmatism
within the secular project.
Like literalism, secularism has its own denial
ot its conditions of possibility—its own found-
ing gesture of bad faith. Secularists' inability to
account for their own status results in an evis-
cerated treatment of modernity and opens a
space for more visceral responses to the aporia
of modernity. This space is filled all too easily
by religious revival movements. By analyzing
these movements, their strategies, and re-
sponses to them in detail, the authors of The
Book of Jerry Falwell, Serving the Word and
Apocalypse Observed have improved under-
standing of both modernity and the wealth ot"
social movements and social worlds that make
up contemporary society. The reward ot" the
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next step—an internal critique of secularism—
will be a better understanding of the unheimlich
experience of modernity and its role in the new
political economy of culture and identity
within which we (Falwell and Koppel, literal-
ists and interpretivists, millennial cultists and
secular academics alike) are all enmeshed.8
notes
1. Charles Lemert (1999) argues that the
differentiation from, and repression oi, relig-
ion is the constitutive, founding gesture ot
social theory and accounts for the failure of
social theory to deal adequately with religion,
with negative consequences for social the-
ory's treatment of modernity.
2. As Harding (p. 311) reminds readers, the
primary theorist of modernity as disenchant-
ment is Max Weber (1930, 1968). An impor-
tant recent presentation is The
Disenchantment of the World: A Political His-
tory of Religion by Marcel Gauchet 1997.
Unheimlich is an ordinary German word
that has become a term of art for both Sigmund
Freud (1955) and Martin Heidegger (1962).
Heimlich means "at home" or familiar; unhe-
imlich means "not at home" or unfamiliar.
Strachey (in Freud 1955) translates unheimlich
as "uncanny." For Heidegger, the term means
not-being-at-home, the state oi homelessness
that produces angst and motivates human cul-
tural and technological production as a search
for a way of feeling at home in the world. We
are utilizing these associations in our title,
claiming that it is the unheimlich nature of the
lived experience of humanity in the modern
world that motivates religious revivalism in
general and fundamentalist movements in par-
ticular.
3. Perhaps capitalism's real opponent is
boredom or satiation, which leads people to
drop out of the production-consumption style.
The unheimlich experience seems now to be
the cutting edge of the expansion of the com-
modity form.
4. For a history oi the changing under-
standing of the notion of experience, see
Heidegger 1967.
5. Such a project is currently underway in
the interdisciplinary successor to the philoso-
phy, history, and sociology of science known
as "science studies." See Barbara Herrnsicin
Smith (1997), especially chapter 8, "Micrody-
namics of Incommensurability: Philosophy of
Science Meets Science Studies."
6. For more on the history of the intellectual
impact of Brown among the legal scholarship
community, see Laura Kalman (1996). For CLS
scholarship, see Mark Kelman (1987). Jacques
Derrida (1992) argues that this original, con-
stitutive, performative gesture of law is ulti-
mately backed by mystical violence. It is a
necessary act of bad faith that obscures this
fact to generate legitimacy for the legal system.
7. My source for this discussion of secular-
ism is William Connolly (2000).
8. Two works that attempt such a history of
a subjectivity attuned to the role of the unhe-
imlich in everyday life are Judith Butler (1997)
and Eric Santner (2001).
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